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Abstract
We present a computational model of the interaction between in-
centives and the allocation of decision rights in an organization. We
show that a principal may obtain the implementation of desired or-
ganizational policies by means of appropriate incentives or by means
of appropriate design of the allocation of decisions, when the latter
is cheaper but more complex. Wa also show that when the princi-
pal is uncertain about which course of action is more appropriate and
wants to learn it from the environment, organizational structure and
incentives interact in non-trivial ways and must be carefully tuned.
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11 Introduction
One of the main di®erences between organizational economics and the evo-
lutionary and capabilities approaches concerns the emphasis that is put on
organizational change. Organizational economics is mainly concerned with
the problem of e±cient allocation of given resources and given capabilities.
Key research questions within this perspective are the design of optimal in-
centives that in a static context boils down to a problem of optimal allocation
of risk (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Fama 1980), of optimal information struc-
tures (Sah and Stiglitz 1986, Radner 1993), of optimal allocation of property
rights (Hart and Moore 1990), of control rights, decision rights and exclusion
rights (Bester 2009, Rajan and Zingales 1998). Evolutionary and capabilities
based approaches1 on the contrary are especially concerned with processes of
learning and adaptation. The key research questions concern how capabili-
ties are acquired and modi¯ed and in particular what are the organizational
structures and processes that favor the generation of organizational capabil-
ities.
A real confrontation between the two theories is somehow di±cult because
they largely lack a common ground. Organizational economics has strongly
emphasized the role of incentives in organizations, re°ecting the overall idea
of neoclassical economics that the role of institutions and organizations is
basically to set the right incentives in order to align the individual pursuit
of self interest with the promotion of collective e±ciency and welfare. The
capabilities view has on the contrary downplayed the role of incentives, often
making the implicit assumption that individual motivation plays little or no
role in the generation and accumulation of capabilities. Last but not least,
the two tradition have also important di®erences in methodology that make
cross-communication di±cult: organizational economics is deeply embedded
in the neoclassical tradition of abstract analytical modeling based upon the
standard toolbox of rationality and equilibrium behavior, while the capabil-
ities view is usually more based on appreciative theory and assumes individ-
uals with strong bounds in rationality and knowledge. Moreover sometimes
it seems to depart from the methodological individualism of economic theory
and assume a separate organizational dimension that cannot be reduced to
1There are indeed important di®erence between evolutionary and capabilities theories of
the ¯rm (see for instance Dosi, Faillo, and Marengo (2008)), but for the present discussion
these di®erences do not seem fundamental.
2the behavior of its member (more on the relations between the two theories
in, e.g., Foss and Foss (2000)). Some existing attempts of bridging the gaps
of the two streams of research have been made (Foss 2005, Dosi, Levinthal,
and Marengo 2003, Coriat and Dosi 1998), but on the whole it is not unfair
to say that the organizational economics literature has very little to say on
learning and capabilities creation and the capabilities literature does not deal
in a satisfactory way of the role of incentives, delegation and power in the
creation and modi¯cation of capabilities.
In this paper we make a novel attempt at bridging this gap that, we be-
lieve, makes some non trivial steps forward. We present an abstract model of
the interplay between organizational structure, incentives and learning and
we focus on the interaction between the allocation of decision rights and in-
centives when the organization is facing complex problems, i.e. problems in
which the organizational behavior is the outcome of the interaction of many
interdependent decisions with strong externalities, both positive and nega-
tive. We show that allocation of decision rights and incentives are largely
substitutes: a principal can obtain a desired course of action by appropriate
re-allocation of decision rights and/or by providing appropriate monetary in-
centives to the agents. The former strategy, i.e. acting on the organizational
design, is very powerful and less expensive and we show that in general by
increasing the division of decision making rights the principal may have her
policies more easily implemented.
The picture becomes more blurred and complicated when the principal
does not know the appropriate course of action but tries to learn it from
environmental feed-back. In this circumstances the principal is facing a dif-
¯cult trade-o®. By using e±ciently the organizational structure (i.e. the
allocation of decision rights) and/or the incentives, she may get her policy
more e±ciently implemented, but she runs the risk of curbing the agents'
alternative visions that may prove very useful for collective learning. This
trade-o®, which is nothing but an instance of the widely discussed exploita-
tion vs. exploration trade-o®, requires a careful tuning of division of decision
rights and incentives.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we describe the main issues
involved in the interaction between incentives, organizational structure and
learning. In section 3 we outline the model and in the following section 4 we
study its main properties. Results are presented in sections 5 and 6 where we
discuss the behavior of the model respectively when the agent knows precisely
3what she wants to get from the agents and when instead she tries to learn
what are the best courses of actions. Finally in section 7 we conclude and
suggest some directions for further developments.
2 Generalized agency relations in learning and
adaptation
Organizational economics usually assumes that con°ict in organizations arises
because individuals have diverging objectives. A typical agency model as-
sumes a principal's utility increasing in the result, decreasing in the salary
paid to the agent and indi®erent with respect to the latter's e®ort. On the
contrary the agent's utility increases in salary, decreases in e®ort and is in-
di®erent to the result.
Without downplaying the role of diverging interests, it must be recognized
that also diverging views are an important source of con°ict in organizations.
Everyone who has had some managing role in a business, academic or govern-
mental organizations has probably experienced such con°ict: people simply
have di®erent ideas about what should be done and how it should be done
and very often such di®erent ideas can only partly, or not all, be ascribed to
their self interest. Sometimes they hold diverging and motivationally strong
view for the mere fact that they sincerely believe that their suggested course
of action is good for the organization and attach high value to this belief.
Con°ict arising from diverging interests and con°ict arising from diverging
vies are often strictly intertwined: a manager of a division or department may
think that more resources must be allocated to the unit she manages both
because she believes to the best of her knowledge that this will serve the
organization's objectives (and indeed this may prove right) and because she
looks for private bene¯ts that she may reap in terms of higher salary, power,
visibility and prestige.
Whereas agency con°ict is inevitably a source of ine±ciency and incen-
tives are needed in order to correct for misalignment of objectives, possibly
together with other devices that act rather upon intrinsic motivation, when
instead con°ict arises because of di®erent views of what must be done, align-
ing them by providing the adequate incentives may prove both more di±cult
and less e±cient.
People do indeed hold di®erent views of what should be done, how things
4should be managed, which alternative courses of actions should be followed
also because, in good faith, they think di®erently about how the same or-
ganizational objectives could be better achieved. This source of con°ict is
likely to be especially relevant when non-routine decisions have to be taken,
when new hard problems are being faced, when strong procedural uncertainty
characterizes the current situation, when organizational and or technological
change is needed, that is, in all situation in which non-routine courses of
action must be envisaged and what must be done is not evident and trans-
parent. In such circumstances organizations do not have to ¯nd optimally
e±cient allocations of given resources, but have to design complex procedures
that may provide valuable solutions to ill-structured problems (Simon 1981).
However, in such situations, di®erent visions are also a fundamental source
of learning. When the principal does not know exactly what should be done,
she may learn from the agents' visions. In this respect, the standard solu-
tion to the problem of con°ict suggested by agency model, that is aligning
the agent's preferences as much as possible with the principal's, may actu-
ally prove detrimental and curb this important source of learning through
diversity.
In this paper we suppose that principals and agents hold di®erent views
of an articulated course of action, that we model by way of a vector of
interdependent policies. The principal has both a problem of implementation
of the wanted policies and a problem of inadequacy of what she believes to
be the right policies.
In the business strategy literature, the former is referred to as the strat-
egy implementation problem (Hrebiniak and Joyce 1984) and considered as a
source of ine±ciency. The organization is viewed as knowing an appropriate
course of action but for a variety of incentive and coordination reasons is not
realizing that set of policies. But an alternative view, e.g. the literature on
emergent strategy (Mintzberg 1973, Burgelman 1994) suggests that the di-
vergence between expressed strategy and actual behavior may be a favorable
circumstance. The search and discovery that results from such discrepancies
may yield the identi¯cation of a superior set of actions than that which would
be suggested by the conscious choice of strategy.
In the following section we outline a model that should help clarifying
these trade-o® under more rigorous terms.
53 The model
We consider a ¯rm that has to take decisions on a set of of n policies P =
fp1;p2;:::;png. For simplicity we assume that each policy may take only
two values pi 2 f0;1g and therefore the set of policies if formed by the 2n
vectors of n binary elements. We will call X this set of 2n policy vectors and
xi = [pi
1;pi
2;:::;pi
n] one generic element thereof.
We concentrate on those cases in which policies interact with each other in
complex ways to determine the overall organizational performance. Decisions
on single policy items generate externalities, both positive and negative, on
other policies. Thus the determination of the correct combination of policies
is a complex task as the performance contribution of a single policy item
depends upon the value taken by other policies. Complementarity and su-
peradditivity (Milgrom and Roberts 1992) among policies are special cases.
We suppose that policy vectors have an exogenously determined perfor-
mance level F, that we normalize in the interval [0,1]: F : X 7! [0;1]. This
mapping determines a policy landscape whose ruggedness re°ects the extent
of interdependencies among policies and thus the complexity of the problem
of ¯nding the best performing policy vector(s) (Levinthal 1997, Page 1996,
Rivkin and Siggelkow 2005). In the analysis and the simulation exercises
below we will consider a generic random assignment of performance value to
each policy vector, thus assuming that the policy landscape has maximum
ruggedness and complexity.
Our organization is composed by a principal ¦ and a number of agents
that may range from 1 up to n. Such agents are attributed decision rights
over a subset of policies. Let A = fa1;a2;:::;ahg with 1 · h · n be a set of
agents and let each agent be de¯ned by a non empty subset of policies under
his control. More precisely, let di µ P a generic non empty subset of the set
of policies, we call a decomposition of decision rights a partition 2 of the set
of policies, i.e. a set of non-empty subsets D = fd1;d2;:::;dkg such that:
h [
i=1
di = X and di
T
dj = ; 8i 6= j
We call organizational structure a mapping of the set D onto the set A of
2Actually we could also assume that some decision rights are ambiguously allocated
and two or more agents are entitled to modify the same policy. This phenomenon, which
is often found in real organizations, can be easily modeled in our framework but we leave
it to further investigation.
6agents, i.e. a mapping that assigns each subset of policies to one and only
one agent. Note that, for simplicity, we assume that the principal does not
directly control any policy item.
Examples of organizational structures in our framework and assuming 4
policy items are:
² fa1 Ã fp1;p2;p3;p4gg, i.e. one agent has control on all four policies
² fa1 Ã fp1g;a2 Ã fp2g;a3 Ã fp3g;a4 Ã fp4gg, i.e. four agents have
each control on one policy
² fa1 Ã fp1;p2g;a2 Ã fp3;p4gg, i.e. two agents have each control on
two policies
² fa1 Ã fp1g;a2 Ã fp2;p3;p4gg, i.e. two agents with \asymmetric"
responsibilities: one has control on the ¯rst policy item and the other
on the remaining three
Finally, the organizational structure may also be characterized by an
agenda, that is a permutation of the set of agents de¯ning the sequence
with which agents are called to decide upon the policy items under their
control.
We suppose that the principal and the agents have each an idiosyncratic
ordering over the space of policy vectors. These di®erent orderings re°ect
both their di®erent visions of how things should be done for the organiza-
tion's best and their own personal interest. The principal is interested in the
overall performance of the organization but in general does not know how
to achieve this objective, i.e. her ordering over the policies space is di®er-
ent from nature's. Also the agents have di®erent orderings from nature's, the
principal's and the other agents'. This may re°ect both their ignorance, their
di®erent visions and their di®erent interests. We will call º¦ the principal's
ordering and ºai the ordering held by agent i. We will assume that all such
orderings are complete and transitive, i.e. that if xi ºk xj and xj ºk xl then
xi ºk xl, with k 2 f¦;a1;a2;:::;ahg.
When asked to decide upon two alternative pro¯les for the policies un-
der his control, an agent will choose the one that ranks higher in his own
preferences, given the current state of the other policy items that are not
under his control, unless the principal gives appropriate monetary incentives
to override the agent's preference and induce him to make a di®erent choice.
7For the sake of simplicity we make a simple linearity assumption and suppose
that the incentives needed to induce an agent to accept a policy pro¯le that
ranks lower in his preference ordering is proportional to the di®erence of the
rankings of the two alternatives. Suppose for instance that agent ai has to
choose between two policy vectors xi and xj (of course the vectors may di®er
only in items under the agent's control) that rank respectively rank(xi) = ri
and rank(xj) = rj with ri < rj, indicating that he prefers xi to xj
3. Of
course the agent would choose vector xi and if the principal wants to reverse
the choice has to pay c(rj ¡ri) where c is, for simplicity, constant and equal
for all agents. We could interpret c as an extra monetary incentive the prin-
cipal has to give the agent in addition to the standard compensation needed
to elicit a normal level of e®ort, which in turn may depend upon the agent's
commitment, motivation and so on.
We suppose that at the outset an initial, status quo, policy vector is (ran-
domly) given4. Then the ¯rst { according to the agenda { agent may modify
the policies under his control. He randomly generates new policy sub-vectors
and chooses the one that, together with current status quo policies that are
not under his control, will determine the vector he prefers, unless payments
from the principal induce him to make a di®erent choice.
When all instantiations have been examined for the ¯rst agent in the
agenda and he has taken a decision, the value he has chosen for the policies
under his control become part of the new status quo. Then the same proce-
dure is repeated for the second, third, ..., h¡th agents in the agenda. Once
all agents have operated on the policies under their control, the agenda is
repeated until an optimum or a cycle are encountered. A (local) optimum is
a policy vector for which no agent ¯nds it convenient to modify items under
his control according to the procedure outlined so far. A cycle is instead a
subset of policy vectors among which the chosen policies keep circling.
In the following section we will present an computational model of this
procedure and show that the ¯nal outcome, that is the (locally) optimal pol-
icy vector that is ¯nally chosen, or the emergence of a cycle, can be highly
manipulated by the principal either by changing the allocation of agents to
di®erent policies or by giving the appropriate monetary incentives. We will
¯rst examine the case in which the principal \knows what she wants" and
3We use the convention that if the agent strictly prefers xi to xj then ri < rj and that
the agent's mostly preferred policy x0 has rank rank(x0) = 1.
4In what follows we often ¯nd properties for all possible initial vectors.
8does not modify her preferences. We will show that in general the princi-
pal may obtain policy vectors that are equal or very close to the ones she
prefers at no or very small cost by appropriately modifying the allocation of
decision rights. Incentives and organizational structure appear therefore as
substitutes. We will also show that cycles may be avoided by appropriately
allocating decision rights and that for the principal it is more likely and easy
to obtained a desired outcome if she relies on a ¯ner division of decision
labor, i.e. if she assigns fewer policy items to each agent.
Then we will consider the situation in which the principal \does not know
what she wants", i.e. tries to learn from the environment which policy vectors
perform better.
4 Paths in the policy space
In this section we analyze the properties of the paths in the space of poli-
cies that emerge out of the procedure informally outlined in the previous
section and show how the outcome of these paths may be manipulated by
the principal through appropriate modi¯cation of the allocation of decision
among given agents. For simplicity we will begin by assuming away monetary
incentives and concentrate only on the organizational structure.
Given a decomposition of decision rights D = fd1;d2;:::;dkg, we say
that the policy vector xi is a preferred neighbor of vector xj with respect
to agent ah who has control of the set of policies dh if the following three
conditions hold:
1. xi ºah xj
2. xº
i = xº
j 8º = 2 dh
3. xi 6= xj
Conditions 2 and 3 require that the two vectors di®er only by policy items
under the control of agent ah. According to the de¯nition, a neighbor can be
reached through the decision of a single agent.
We call Hi(x;ai) the set of preferred neighbors of an outcome x for agent
ai.
A path P(xi;D;®) from an outcome xi, a decomposition D and an agenda
® is a sequence, starting from xi, of preferred neighbors for the agents in :
P(xi;D;®) = xi;xi+1;xi+2;::: with xi+m+1 2 H(xi+m;D;ai+m+1 2 ®)
9A vector xj is reachable from another vector xi and for the decomposition
D if there exist a path P(xi;D;®) such that xj 2 P(xi;D;®).
A path can end up either on a (local) optimum, i.e. a vector which does
not have any preferred neighbor, or in a cycle among a set of vectors which
are preferred neighbors to each other.
The set of best neighbors Bi(x;ai) µ Hi(x;ai) of a vector x for agent
ai is the set of the most preferred outcomes in the set of neighbors for the
agent:
Bi(x;ai) = fy 2 Hi(x;ai) such that y Âai z 8z 2 Hi(x;ai)g
By extension from a single agent to the entire organization, we can give
the following de¯nition of the set of neighbors for an organization as:
H(x;A) =
k [
i=1
Hi(x;ai)
An outcome x is a local optimum for the decomposition D and the set
of agents A if there does not exist an outcome y such that y 2 H(x;A).
A cycle is a set X0 = fx0
1;x0
2;:::;x0
jg of policy vectors such that x0
1 2
H(x0
j;ai1), x0
j 2 H(x0
j¡1;ai2), ..., x0
2 2 H(x0
1;ail).
5 Getting what you want when you know what
you want
Let us ¯rst examine the case in which the principal precisely knows the set
of policies she wants to be implemented either because she has the right
knowledge of the environment, i.e. her ordering over the space of policy
vectors corresponds to their true performance value, or because she simply
wants her vision to be implemented, whatever the result.
The principal has two means of achieving this goal, she can act on the
incentives or she can act on the organizational structure. In the former case
the principal tries to align the agents's decisions to her preferences by giving
the agents monetary incentives to do so. In the latter case the principal
chooses instead an appropriate allocation of decision rights to the managers.
Let us ¯rst show, by means of a few examples, that the principal can in
principle manipulate the agent's decision to a large extent and obtain a policy
10pro¯le equal or very close to her preferred vector without providing extra
incentives.
Consider ¯rst a very simple example in which 3 agents have a common
most preferred choice, which is not the preferred option of the principal. The
following table presents their individual preferences, ranked from the most
to the least preferred outcome:
Order Agent1 Agent2 Agent3 Principal
1st 011 011 011 000
2nd 111 000 010 101
3rd 000 001 100 111
4th 010 110 101 110
5th 100 010 000 100
6th 110 111 110 001
7th 101 101 111 010
8th 001 100 001 011
Example I: the emergence of a local optima
All the agents prefer vector [0;1;1] to any other option, but this vector
is the least preferred by the principal. This looks indeed a bad situation for
the principal and apparently she could get better outcomes only by incurring
high incentive costs, but at a closer scrutiny we notice that the principal can
actually avoid such costs.
Consider for instance the organizational structure fa1 Ã fp1g;a2 Ã
fp2g;a3 Ã fp3g, with agenda (a1;a2;a3) and the initial status quo [1;1;0].
Agent 1 decides ¯rst and chooses to switch to 0 the policy p1 under his con-
trol (because [1;1;0] ¹a1 [0;1;0]), then agent 2 will switch to 0 the policy
p2 under his control. The policy vector has now become [0;0;0] and agent 3
will not further modify it because [0;0;1] ¹a3 [0;0;0], neither will agents 1
and 2: [0;0;0] is a local optimum for this organizational structure and the
principal can obtain it at no cost, even if it is dominated by another policy
vector for all the agents.
The same result could be obtained for instance with the organizational
structure fa1 Ã fp1;p2g;a3 Ã fp3gg. However, of course, with other organi-
zational structures, for instance by keeping all 3 items together and assigning
them to the one of the agents, this result could not be achieved and the prin-
cipal's least preferred policy would always prevail unless further monetary
incentives are put in place.
11Actually the results may be stronger than this. It is indeed possible to
provide cases in which the same group of agents can generate di®erent global
optima (i.e. optima that are stably reached from any initial condition) or
cycles, depending upon the organizational structure. One such example may
be illustrated with the following table that summarizes the preferences of
three hypothetical agents:
Order Agent1 Agent2 Agent3
1st 001 000 001
2nd 110 111 110
3rd 000 001 000
4th 010 010 010
5th 100 100 100
6th 011 011 011
7th 111 101 111
8th 101 110 101
Example II: cycles or di®erent global optima
It is easy to verify that this triple of agents (note that agents 1 and 3
are identical) may either generate a cycle, or the vector [0,0,1] as unique
global optimum or the vector [0,0,0] as another unique global optimum given
three di®erent organization structure. A principal could get one of these very
di®erent outcomes simply by changing the organizational structure.
Structure fa1 Ã fp1;p2g;a2 Ã fp3gg always generates the cycle [001] !
[000] ! [110] ! [111] ! [001]. It is therefore a structure in which intra-
organizational con°ict does never settle into an equilibrium. Structure fa1 Ã
fp1g;a2 Ã fp2g;a3 Ã fp3gg has the unique global optimum [001] that is
reached from every initial condition, whereas structure fa1 Ã fp1g;a2 Ã
fp2;p3g also produces a unique global optimum but a di®erent one, i.e. vector
[000].
We cannot here provide more general results, but in Marengo and Set-
tepanella (2008) it is formally proven, by using some properties of the ge-
ometry of hyperplanes arrangements and in the slightly di®erent context of
social choice with majority voting, that any kind of cycle can always be bro-
ken by appropriate changes of what we call here organizational structure and
necessary and su±cient conditions are given for any vector (e.g. the princi-
pal's most preferred policy pro¯le) to be a global or local optimum for an
appropriate organizational structure.
12So far we simply shown some example crafted in such a way as to show
the possibility of manipulation of the outcome of the organizational deci-
sion processes by allocating di®erently decision rights. One could wonder
how general this results are and how this manipulation could complement
or substitute the manipulation that may be achieved by incentives, i.e. by
modifying the agents' choices through alteration of their payo® landscape.
In order to answer this question we investigated the general properties
of random populations of agents and principals. We simulated randomly
generated problems with n = 8 policy items and up to 8 agents with randomly
generated preferences. We have tested the following organizational structures
with 1, 2, 4 and 8 agents5:
² O1: a1 Ã f1;2;3;4;5;6;7;8g
² O2: a1 Ã f1;2;3;4g;a2 Ã f5;6;7;8g
² O4: a1 Ã f1;2g;a2 Ã f3;4g;a3 Ã f5;6g;a4 Ã f7;8g
² O8: a1 Ã f1g;a2 Ã f2g;a3 Ã f3g;a4 Ã f4g;a5 Ã f5g;a6 Ã
f6g;a7 Ã f7g;a8 Ã f8g
The following table presents the average number of local optima obtained
over 1000 di®erent randomly generated problems (with standard deviations
in brackets):
Org. Structure N. of local optima
O1
1
(0:0)
O2
10:4
(1:3)
O4
18:1
(2:7)
O8
24:7
(4:1)
Number of local optima for di®erent organizations
(n=8, 1000 repetitions)
5When only a subset of the 8 agents where employed, i.e. in all organizational structure
but the one designated by 08, the assignment of agents to the elements of the decomposition
was also made randomly.
13The table clearly shows the source of a possible "divide and conquer"
strategy by the principal: by partitioning more ¯nely decision rights and hir-
ing more agents, each of them with responsibility on only very few policies,
the principal can more easily and cheaply manipulate the organization's de-
cision. The table shows the sharp increase in the number of local optima that
can be obtained with more ¯ne grained organizational structures and there-
fore the higher possibility of ¯nding a local optimum equal or close enough
to the principal's most preferred policy pro¯le.
So far we have shown how the principal's objective may be obtained by
appropriate design of the organizational structure. The same result could
be also obtained by monetary incentives, that is by paying the cost c(rj ¡
ri) in order to induce the agent to choose a policy pro¯le against his own
preferences. The two are clearly substitutes as shown by the following table
that summarizes the results of a series of simulations. The following table
reports the total costs incurred by a randomly generated principal in order
to obtain the implementation of her most preferred policy vector for the four
di®erent organizational structures and for every possible initial condition. It
is shown that in more ¯ne grained structures the principal can achieve his
most preferred vector at a much lower cost, because she can take advantage of
the agent freely choosing a local optimum close enough to her preferred policy
and having to pay only the extra cost of moving from that local optimum to
her most preferred vector.
Org. Structure Average cost for principal
O1 717
O2 1051
O4 2403
O8 15071
Average cost incurred by principal for preferred policy
(n=8, 1000 repetitions, all costs have to be multiplied by c)
All in all, the organizational structure is a substitute for incentives.
6 Adaptively learning principal
Let us now turn to the more interesting and realistic case in which the prin-
cipal does not know the \right" model of the world. She holds an ordering of
14the policy vectors that may not re°ect their true relative performance and she
is aware of her ignorance. Thus the principal, along with trying to have her
preferred policies implemented, also tries to sample the performance value of
di®erent policy vectors in order to adaptively learn from the environmental
feed-backs and avoid lock-in into inferior policies.
This determines a complex trade-o® between aligning the agents' decisions
to the principal's preferences or letting agents more free to choose policies
according to their own idiosyncratic preferences6. If, by means of appropri-
ate incentive and/or organizational structures, the principal optimizes such
alignment she will have her preferred policies e±ciently implemented, but
agents who may hold better models of the environment and could implement
policies with higher performance may be forced into the straightjacket of the
principal's vision. On the other hand, if the principal implements looser in-
centives and organizational structures that divide less ¯nely decision rights
and leaves higher freedom to the agents to implement their own preferred
policies, she may learn that some of the agents' ideas may actually perform
better in the environment but on the other hand she may loose control of the
organization and the latter may be ¯nally oriented by some agents to serve
their own interests.
In this section we examine this trade-o® and analyze in particular how the
choice of incentives on one hand and the choice of organizational structure
on the other may strike di®erent balances. We will assume a very simple
learning mechanism for the principal: if at two successive moments in time
t and t + 1 two di®erent policy vectors xt and xt+1 are implemented with
xt 6= xt+1, the principal may check if their performance levels are in line with
her preferences and swaps their positions in the ranking if they are not. On
the contrary we assume that agents do not learn and keep their preferences
unchanged7.
Let us begin by examining the role of the organizational structure in the
absence of extra incentives. We concluded the previous section showing that
in a static environment the principal may more cheaply obtain the desired
policies by decomposing as much as possible decision rights. When instead
6This trade-o® is a special case of the more general trade-o® between exploitation and
exploration in organizational learning(March 1991).
7An extension of the present model by allowing that also agents are exposed to en-
vironmental signal (possibly mediated by the principal) and adaptively learn will be the
object of future research.
15the principal also needs to learn the true structure of the environment such
decomposition principle does not hold.
Having the desired policy strictly implemented, either by appropriate or-
ganizational design or by strong incentives prevents the testing of alternative
policies and hinders learning. At the opposite extreme if the principal simply
hires one agents and delegates to him all decisions without any decomposi-
tion, no learning will be possible as the agent will always implement his own
preferred policy vector. Intermediate levels of decompositions of decision
rights seem more appropriate for striking a good balance between the e±-
cient implementation of the principal's plans and learning and adaptation.
This result is summarized in the following ¯gure 1 where we compare the
performance of the four di®erent organizational structures already used in
the previous section in randomly generated problems with learning princi-
pals and no extra incentives. The ¯gure shows that structure O1 does not
allow any learning, structure O8 allows very little, while better performances
are achieved with structures O4 and, especially, O2.
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Figure 1: Learning and organizational structures
A similar trade-o® emerges if the principal uses incentives rather than the
organizational structure. Strong incentives do indeed induce agents to choose
16the principal's preferred policy but do not allow the principal to test di®er-
ent policies and learn from the environment. Moreover, obviously, strong
incentives are also more costly. On the contrary weak incentives leave too
much freedom to agents and do not result in the implementation of the policy
pro¯les the principal may have learnt to perform best. Intermediate levels of
incentives are those more apt to promote learning and better performance.
More interesting is perhaps the case in which incentives and organizational
structure may be dynamically combined together. In these cases the picture
becomes more complicated, as the organizational structure also determines
the speed and breadth of learning (Marengo and Dosi 2005). As already
shown, ¯ner decompositions of decision rights determine a sharp increase in
the number of locally optima organizational equilibria. Using little monetary
incentive the principal may easily induce the organization to climb quickly
one of these local optima. However the organization is then locked-in into
this local optimum and re-designs of the incentives and/or organizational
structures are needed for un-locking. Lower levels of division of decision
making labor on the contrary are less subject to lock-in and increase the
number of policy pro¯les that are tested. This results in a much broader
scope for learning, but such learning tend to be slow. Moreover incentives
must be carefully designed, otherwise the organization will simply follow the
agents' preferences.
The following propositions summarize the simulations results:
² in environments with low complexity (i.e. smooth performance land-
scapes with few peaks), ¯ne decompositions of decision rights and
medium or low powered powered incentives are more e±cient, as the
organization quickly climbs one of the few local optima whose location
is easily learnt by the principal (because of low complexity);
² in environments with high complexity (i.e. rugged performance land-
scapes with many local peaks), we must distinguish cases in which the
competitive pressure is low or high. With the former we indicate cases
in which the organization may learn slowly and low short-term per-
formance is tolerated provided it conduces to high future performance
levels. By the latter instead we mean that low performance in the short
term is promptly punished (possibly with bankruptcy):
{ with low competitive pressure, learning is fostered if decision rights
are kept together under the control of one or very few agents and
17incentives are medium powered. However learning tends to be
slow;
{ as competitive pressure increases and it becomes necessary to in-
crease fast the performance, the division of decision rights must
increase and incentives must become stronger.
All in all, competitive pressure tends to produce ¯ner than optimal (in
the long run) decompositions of decision rights and stronger than optimal
(in the long run) incentives.
7 Conclusions and directions for further re-
search
In this paper we have introduced a model that studies the interplay between
learning, incentives and allocation of decision rights (the organizational struc-
ture) in a generalized agency problem whereby principals and agents have
diverging visions of the right courses of action for the organization, rather
than simply con°icting interests.
Our main results could be summarized as follows. When learning is not
at stake, incentives and organizational structure are substitutes. Diverging
visions among the principal and the agents may be to a large extent diluted
by careful organizational design and incentives may be used as secondary
devices. Somehow our model tends to support the idea that rules and orga-
nization may be more important than incentives in order to align individual
behaviors to a common goal.
When instead learning is at stake, organizational structure and incentives
may complement each other and have to be ¯ne tuned according to the
complexity of the learning process and the competitive pressure which is put
on fast or slow learning.
The model is rather rich and only a subset of possible research questions
have been examined in the present paper. Among the possible lines of further
research is the introduction of some learning process also for the agents,
possibly with partial environmental feed-back only on the policies under their
control. One should also consider the costs of hiring agents that are likely
to depend on their span of control. Agents that are given responsibility of
larger sets of policies are likely to be more costly, whereas in the present
paper such costs have not been considered.
18Finally, it would interesting to model the organizational structure itself
as subject to learning. The allocation of decision rights could be modi¯ed
adaptively, for instance by taking one policy item out of the control of one
agent and giving it to the control of another randomly selected agent. This
would introduce a new learning process, certainly slower (the space of or-
ganizational structures is larger than the space of policies) but that could
interact in non trivial ways with the learning of policy pro¯les. This will be
the the subject of further work.
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